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Abstract : Performance-based management (PBM) has become a dominant form
of governance in health care and there is a need for careful assessment of its
function and effects. This article contains a cross-disciplinary literature synthesis
of current studies of PBM. Literature was retrieved by database searches and
categorized according to analytical differences and similarities concerning
(1) purpose and (2) governance mechanism of PBM. The literature could
be grouped into three approaches to the study of PBM, which we termed:
the ‘functionalist’, the ‘interpretive’ and the ‘post-modern’ perspective. In the
functionalist perspective, PBM is perceived as a management tool aimed at
improving health care services by means of market-based mechanisms. In the
interpretive perspective, the adoption of PBM is understood as consequence
of institutional and individual agents striving for public legitimacy. In the
post-modern perspective, PBM is analysed as a form of governance, which has
become so ingrained in Western culture that health care professionals internalize
and understand their own behaviour and goals according to the values expressed
in these governance systems. The recognition of differences in analytical
perspectives allows appreciation of otherwise implicit assumptions and potential
implications of PBM. Reflections on such differences are important to ensure
vigilant appropriation of shifting management tools in health quality governance.
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Introduction
Performance-based management (PBM) has become a dominant form of manage-
ment in many Western societies, also in the health care sector. In this paper, PBM is
understood as a form of governance in which: (1) desired results are specified in
advance in measurable form; (2) some system of monitoring measures performance
against that specification; and (3) feedback mechanisms are linked to measured
performance (Bevan and Hood, 2006). These concepts are reflected in some types of
accreditation, regular evaluations, hospital rating systems, etc. It has been argued
that PBM represents a trend towards marketization of health care service delivery
(Cacace et al., 2011: 6–8), and a vast literature has developed to assess precondi-
tions for and effects of PBM (cf. Groene et al., 2008; de Vos et al., 2009). Existing
reviews have focused on studies published primarily in medical journals and to some
degree presupposed the purpose with PBM as well as the involved regulatory
mechanisms (Marshall et al., 2000b; Fung et al., 2008; Groene et al., 2008; de Vos
et al., 2009). One systematic review from 2002 identified two diverse approaches to
the conception of PBM showing that the studies build on different assumptions
about the rationale for introducing such systems as well as different perceptions of
what constitutes valid knowledge about system performance, indicating a need
for further study of the assumptions governing PBM (Freeman, 2002). A widely
recognized reading of organizational studies (Hatch, 1997), similarly suggested a
need to appreciate the influence of implicit assumptions when comparing studies
from different research traditions. Building on these insights, the present study
analyses a wide range of studies of PBM in hospitals and similar organizations to
elucidate the theoretical assumptions on which they build. By comparing medical
studies with analyses of PBM from the social sciences (e.g. anthropology, sociology,
political science and economics), we seek to deliver a multi-faceted, interdisciplinary
understanding of how PBM influences the health care sector. The synthesis is not a
standard, systematic literature review but rather a theoretical contribution, which is
meant to increase reflectivity when approaching new governance tools in the health
care sector whether from the perspective of research or applied health governance.
Method
The literature search was performed in two stages. In stage one, studies were sought
in the following databases: MedLine, Sociological Abstracts, ERIC, FRANCIS,
Worldwide Political Science Abstracts and Web of Science using the following terms
combined with OR: performance data, performance indicator, quality assessment,
quality performance, quality rating, quality improvement, quality control and
benchmarking in combination with terms describing the setting (hospital, health
care, health service, public sector) via the AND-function. Search results were refined
by adding the following terms: policy, management, regulation, control and
inspection. At this stage, criteria for inclusion were: studies of preconditions for and
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effects of PBM systems in the hospital sector. Criteria for exclusion were:
intra-system indicator refinements; non-English publication. This search yielded
predominantly studies from medical and economic traditions. To achieve our pur-
pose of contributing new theoretical insights about PBM based on interdisciplinary
literature analysis, a second literature search was performed to retrieve also studies
from sociological, political science and humanistic traditions. At this stage, we used
more overarching search terms since the social science and humanities literature
typically address PBM in a generic sense. We searched Sociological Abstracts,
Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, AnthroSource and Web of Science (social
science and humanities) databases using the following terms combined with OR:
audit, accountancy, accountability, assurance, performance-based management and
evaluation. Results were refined by adding the following terms using AND: hospital,
health care, health service, public sector, policy, management, regulation, control
and inspection. We also broadened the inclusion criteria to include studies that did
not examine PBM specifically in a hospital setting but analysed it as a governance
form across, for example, health care, education and other public sectors.
Summaries of the retrieved studies were made upon reading by Ane Lind and
Sarah Wadmann, and the summaries were organized in analytical categories
in a bottom-up process (cf. Clarke, 2005). The categorization of the studies was
based on similarities and differences in assumptions about (a) purpose and
(b) governance mechanism of PBM reflected in the studies. With governance
mechanism we drew upon the understanding found in Miller and Rose (2008):
we looked for perceptions of how PBM can alter human and organizational
behaviour, including understandings of motivation and agency of organizational
agents. Three analytical categories were formed and termed: the ‘functional’, the
‘interpretive’ and the ‘post-modern’ perspective. We found that the studies could
be ordered in these groups since they shared an analytical approach to PBM
as a form of governance even when the studies within each category presented
different results. While all the retrieved studies were placed in one of the three
categories, not all were easily categorized, mainly because theoretical assump-
tions remain implicit in several studies on PBM. In cases of doubt, studies were
discussed and categorized after agreement was obtained among the authors of
this article. Because categorization reflects the perception of the author group, it
may not be in accordance with the perception of the authors’ of the original
studies. Whereas the categories highlight analytical differences, they are not
mutually exclusive. Individual studies occasionally describe several dimensions
of PBM and all dimensions may not confer to one category. Elements of
particular studies may therefore fit better in one category than in others.
Results
Studies categorized as ‘functional’ shared a view of the purpose of PBM as a
means to improve health care service delivery, and the governance mechanism
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was assumed to be increased competition among hospitals. Studies categorized
as ‘interpretive’ explained the purpose differently as they explained the adoption
of PBM with institutional and individual agents striving for public legitimacy
(rather than health care optimization), and the governance mechanism was
assumed to be inter-subjective desires to live up to societal norms of what consti-
tutes good management. These studies focus on the psychological, social or
emotional reasons for strategic manoeuvreing at the level of individual agents and
organizations to achieve desired goals – irrespective of their health outcome.
Finally, we found a group of studies, which we categorized as ‘post-modern’. In
these studies, PBM is analysed as a socio-cultural phenomenon primarily serving
the purpose of stabilizing societal power relations. These studies understood the
governance mechanism as working through internalization of values expressed in
PBM by health (and other) professionals and self-evaluation of their behaviour in
accordance to these values, but put no emphasis on strategic manoeuvreing.
In fact, individual actors were described as subjected to changes in their own
values without conscious adaptation. The various perspectives will be described in
more detail in the following, and Table 2 summarizes how they differentiate.
PBM in a functional perspective
In the studies, we categorized as functional, PBM is understood as a management
tool serving the purpose of performance and/or quality improvement of health care
service delivery by means of market-based mechanisms (e.g. Smith, 1990, 1995;
Davies and Mannion, 1999; Goddard et al., 2000; Marshall et al., 2000b; Lansky,
2002; Marshall et al., 2003; Bevan and Hood, 2006; O’Neill Jr., 2006). The idea is
that the disclosure of performance data will promote transparency (Hibbard et al.,
1997; Longo et al., 1997; Hibbard et al., 2003; Faber et al., 2009), reduce
information asymmetry (Maynard and Bloor, 2003) and thereby spur competition
between hospitals since patients obtain information that enable them to choose
provider based on treatment quality (Davies and Mannion, 1999). In this strain of
literature, PBM is discussed as an element in a move towards more patient-centred
health care (Hibbard et al., 1997; Hibbard et al., 2003). In health care systems
with pay for performance or fee for service payment systems, it creates an
economic incentive for hospitals to obtain good performance measures (Marshall
et al., 2000b). Hereby, this perception of PBM rests on the assumptions that:
(1) health care quality can be measured by performance indicators, and
(2) individuals will use the information as a basis for health care provider choice to
seek what they perceive to be the best possible health care given they are free
to choose. Hereby, these studies share a conception of motivation as utility maxi-
mization and build on an idea of free human agents. Thus, within this thinking
agency is perceived as a rational choice; decision-makers – whether patients or
hospital management – are expected to choose the solutions they believe will lead
them to obtain their goals.
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Sharing these basic assumptions of motivation and agency, several of the studies
in the functional perspective critically assess preconditions for the functioning of
PBM systems, including measurement methods, data validity and patients’ choice
behaviour. Several studies discuss advantages and limitations of different types of
performance indicators (process, outcome or structural indicators; Hatry et al.,
1994; Goddard et al., 2000; Mannion and Goddard, 2001), and specific PBM
systems are analysed in terms of their ability to capture what is perceived as health
care quality (Brook et al., 2000; Shepperd et al., 2002; Barker et al., 2004; Rowan
et al., 2004; Smith, 2005; Bevan and Hood, 2006). Suggestions for improving
particular PBM systems are offered by some authors (Davies, 2001; Smith, 2002;
Snelling, 2003; Smith, 2005) while others argue that it is not possible to adjust for
all sources of bias since the phenomenon is so complex (Epstein, 1995; Perrin,
1998; Lilford et al., 2004). Many authors question the validity of performance
measurements (e.g. Epstein, 1995; Davies and Mannion, 1999; Davies, 2001;
Mannion and Goddard, 2001; Mannion et al., 2005; Brown and Lilford, 2006;
Calnan and Rowe, 2008), including time-lag between performance measurements
and performance disclosure leading to an outdated – and thereby spurious – basis
for hospital management (Davies and Mannion, 1999; Davies, 2001; Mannion
and Goddard, 2001; Bevan and Hood, 2006). Though critical towards PBM
systems, the studies retain a focus on the expected outcome and limit themselves
to investigating the performance measures already addressed by the PBM system.
We have therefore categorized them as functional. A considerable number of
studies are devoted to the investigation of what informs patients’ choice of health
care providers. It is shown that patients generally think that information about
hospital performance should be publicly available (Mannion and Davies, 2002;
Magee et al., 2003) but also that they may not understand it (Hibbard and Jewett,
1997; Davies and Marshall, 1999; Epstein, 2000), and rarely seek the information
(Schneider and Epstein, 1998; Laing and Hogg, 2002; Magee et al., 2003),
because other types of information (e.g. peers’ experiences) tend to be more
important for their provider choice (Schneider and Epstein, 1998; Marshall et al.,
2000a, 2000b; Mannion and Davies, 2002; Magee et al., 2003; Marshall et al.,
2003) they prefer primary care providers to make choices about hospital treat-
ment for them (Laing and Hogg, 2002; Magee et al., 2003) or their choice is
based on loyalty towards local hospitals (Schneider and Epstein, 1998; Magee
et al., 2003). Based on focus group interviews, Magee et al. (2003) found that
English citizens did not value information about death rates but preferred infor-
mation such as hospital facilities, public transportation, waiting time, and the
specialization, experience and success rates of individual physicians. While the
authors express skepticism about the ability of performance indicators to inform
consumer choice about hospital care, they do not challenge the basic under-
standing of PBM as a market-based management tool, and therefore we have
categorized the studies as functional. Some studies observe that hospitals tend to
react on the implementation of hospital PBM programs even if patients do
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not respond strongly on the performance information and irrespective of their
ranking, and suggest that PBM systems govern organizational change due to
a competition possibility (Marshall et al., 2000b; Mannion et al., 2005). The
mechanism suggested is peer comparison (Cacace et al., 2011), and in that sense
the conception of the governance mechanism still rests on market thinking.
Since the studies characterized as functional often focus on specific manage-
ment programs, they attempt to measure specific effects of PBM systems. While
it is often observed that the implementation of PBM programs spurs the
initiation of quality improvement initiatives in hospitals (Marshall et al., 2000b;
Hibbard et al., 2003; Mannion et al., 2005), the effects in terms of care delivery
and patient outcomes are not clear (Goddard et al., 2000; Marshall et al.,
2000b; Marshall et al., 2003). Only few studies measure patient outcomes
following the implementation of PBM programs. Examples include Merle et al.
(2009) who conclude that readmission rates after hip fracture surgery in two out
of three French hospitals dropped significantly after the implementation of a
number of self-identified performance indicators. No differences on functional
ability, mortality or duration of hospitalization were observed (Merle et al.,
2009). In an American context, Werner and Bradlow (2010) found that the
publication of hospital performance data (measured by process indicators) is
associated with reduced mortality rates, shorter duration of hospitalization and
lower readmission rates (Chassin et al., 1996; Werner and Bradlow, 2010).
Chassin et al. (1996) concluded that a marked reduction in cardiac surgery
mortality (41% during the first year after implementation) in New York State
hospitals could be attributed partly to the introduction of the PBM system and
partly to improved treatment technologies. It has, however, also been suggested
that the observed effects on mortality can reflect changed reporting behaviour
rather than or in addition to actual system improvement (Green and Wintfeld,
1995 discussed in Goddard et al., 2000). Indeed several studies discuss how
economic incentives can lead to changes in data registration or even data
manipulation (Smith, 1995; Davies and Mannion, 1999; Davies and Marshall,
1999; Goddard et al., 2000; Mannion and Davies, 2002; Mannion et al., 2005;
Bevan and Hood, 2006).
In several studies, it is argued that the introduction of PBM systems can lead to
unintended effects that may even influence health care delivery in undesirable
ways. As such consequences are still limited to ‘function’ understood as perfor-
mance according to criteria similar to those used in PBM systems, we find that they
share assumptions with the rest of the literature here termed functional. The
possible, unintended consequences identified in the studies are summarized in
Table 1 using the terms proposed by Smith in his classical study (1995). While
Smith derives the possible adverse effects from economic theory and analysis of
incentive structures, the occurrence of ‘tunnel vision’ and ‘data manipulation’ is
also confirmed empirically, for example, in the British health care system by
Mannion et al. (2005). Whether pointing to positive or negative effects, the studies
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we categorize as functional subscribe to an idea of utility maximizing agents
implying an understanding of human behaviour as strategic and motivated by self-
interest – whether focusing on patients or health care providers. While these stu-
dies are able to deliver precise instructions for system changes, these recommen-
dations will, however, build on assumptions about what motivates behavioural
change that are criticized for being very restrictive since social and cultural aspects
of human action are ignored.
PBM in an interpretive perspective
The studies categorized here as interpretive seek to explain the dissemination of
PBM by moving beyond the proclaimed intentions and instead investigating
how the involved actors interpret legitimate action. The studies take as a starting
point the observation that management systems such as PBM often proliferate
Table 1. Unintended consequences of PBM systems
Term Description References
Gaming Altering of documentation practices
rather than clinical practices; eventually
data manipulation
Smith (1995), Davies and Mannion
(1999), Davies and Marshall
(1999), Goddard et al. (2000),
Mannion and Davies (2002),
Mannion et al. (2005), Bevan and
Hood (2006)
Cream-skimming Prioritizing of patients who are likely to
generate good performance measures
e.g. due to good prognosis over patients
that are likely to lead to poor
performance measurements
Perrin (1998), Marshall et al.
(2000b), Smith (2005)
Ossification If performance indicators are not updated
in accordance with the development e.g.
of clinical guidelines or if organizational
innovation is down prioritized in fear of
poor performance evaluation
Smith (1990, 1995), Mannion and
Davies (2002)
Tunnel vision Narrowing of managerial attention e.g.
downplaying experimental treatment,
HR or other non-measured areas
Smith (1990, 1995) Davies and
Mannion (1999), Goddard et al.
(2000), Mannion et al. (2005)
Goal fixation Attention focused on obtaining good
measures rather than improving
underlying quality problems
Smith (1995), Perrin (1998)
Sub-optimization Attention focused on local performance
results rather than overall
organizational goals
Smith (1995)
Myopia Attention focused on short term rather
than long term goals; e.g. cost-shifting
from long-term to short-term priorities
Smith (1990, 1995), Perrin (1998),
Goddard et al. (2000), McLoughlin
and Leatherman (2003)
PBM5 performance-based management.
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even if it can rarely be determined whether they constitute the most effective
solution to the experienced problems and may become detached from the
organizational functions they were meant to address. Based on these ascertain-
ments, the studies in the interpretive perspective offer explanations of why it is
so (Dahler-Larsen, 1999; Erlingsdo´ttir, 1999: 57; Lindholm, 1999: 132; Power,
1999: 4; Pettersen and Nyland, 2006; Wehmeier, 2006; Gendron et al., 2007).
In the studies, it is suggested that PBM programs are adopted as a consequence
of policymakers and other agents striving to obtain legitimacy (Dahler-Larsen,
1999; Power, 1999: 94–97; Vrangbæk, 1999: 41; Sahlin-Andersson, 2003:
239; Gendron et al., 2007). From the functional perspective, the implementation
of management systems that merely serve symbolic functions would be per-
ceived of as irrational. However, the interpretive studies explain that it can still
be rational to adopt PBM systems (Power, 1999: 89): by adhering to external
expectations about what constitutes responsible hospital management,
the organization gains legitimacy and thereby funding possibilities increases
(whether financing of hospital services is based on public funds, or contracts
with insurance companies, health maintenance organizations or others that
demand health care services on behalf of patients). So, the point is that PBM
may not be adopted because it is perceived as the most effective solution to
experienced problems at local hospitals but because it has come to be perceived
as a good management tool by those who hold authority to allocate funds to
the hospitals. Further, the detachment of PBM programs from organizational
core functions may protect the delivery of health care services in situations where
hospitals face contradictory managerial expectations (Dahler-Larsen, 1999;
Jespersen, 1999: 163; Pettersen and Nyland, 2006), for example, due to the
introduction of several (and sometime conflicting) health care reforms within a
short time span (Vrangbæk, 2003: 57, 63). So, in an interpretive perspective the
purpose of introducing PBM systems is to obtain organizational legitimacy and
thereby organizational survival by adhering to dominant management norms
(Lindholm, 1999: 133; Wehmeier, 2006). In contrast to the functional perspective,
the governance mechanism is not explained in terms of market-based mechanisms
but rather in terms of societal norms that influence organizational behaviour
according to a logic of appropriateness. Hereby, the studies we have characterized
as interpretive share the understanding that what motivates behavioural change is
to live up to external expectations. According to these studies, organizational
behaviour is shaped and changes over time reflecting dominant norms of what
constitutes responsible hospital management (Lindholm, 1999: 132). In the
interpretive studies, the conception of agency is therefore more restrictive than in
the functional studies. While it is assumed that decision-makers are able to
manoeuvre somewhat strategically, the repertoire from which management
solutions can be chosen is limited by dominant social norms.
Even if the PBM systems are perceived to serve symbolic functions, several of
the interpretive studies point out that the organizational effects can be very real.
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In the short run, it is pointed out, that the implementation of PBM systems can
contribute organizational stability since it is likely to increase stakeholders’
confidence in the organization when they receive the information they expect
in the way they expect (Lindholm, 1999: 136). However, achieving stability
may require allocation of considerable time and other resources to activities
that may have little direct bearing on formal objectives (Davies and Lampel,
1998; Jespersen, 1999: 165–166; Pettersen and Nyland, 2006). This may lead
to skepticism among employees about management goals (Jespersen, 1999:
165–166). The introduction of external systems for performance evaluation
may also hamper employee-driven quality assurance initiatives (Davies and
Lampel, 1998; Power, 1999: 135; Freeman and Walshe, 2004; Wehmeier, 2006).
Furthermore, even if the management systems are often presented as objective
and economically necessary instruments, the introduction of PBM systems
can gradually shape the understanding in organizations of what constitutes
important problems, possible solutions and desirable goals (Dahler-Larsen,
1999; Power, 1999: 97; Pentland, 2000; Sahlin-Andersson, 2003: 304;
Wehmeier, 2006; Gendron et al., 2007). Therefore, the uptake of fashionable
management ideas can have far-reaching consequences since it is likely to
establish certain ‘paths’ for health system development (Tuohy, 2003). Since the
studies in the interpretive perspective analyse PBM within a broader societal
context, programme-specific recommendations for the refinement of PBM systems
are not to be derived from these studies. Rather, they offer understandings of the
political and cultural ideas underlying PBM as a form of governance and point at
more far-reaching implications of introducing such management principles in
health care delivery. Several authors anticipate that an introduction of private
sector logics in public sector service delivery will entail hospitals being measured
and assessed on criteria incompatible with medical logics and therefore push health
care delivery in unforeseen and possibly undesirable directions (Davies and
Lampel, 1998; Erlingsdo´ttir, 1999: 58; Jespersen, 1999: 143; Vrangbæk, 1999: 40;
Walshe, 2002; Dent, 2005; Pettersen and Nyland, 2006).
PBM in a post-modern perspective
The studies we have categorized as post-modern approach PBM as a socio-
political and cultural phenomenon, that is, as an ‘audit culture’ reflecting and
influencing the wider political order in the surrounding society (Strathern, 2000a).
So, while the interpretive studies explore PBM as a governance system within
a managerial realm, the studies categorized as post-modern investigate it as
a phenomenon that permeates and shapes Western societies at a much more
fundamental level. The interest in PBM revolves especially around what the
management systems produce in terms of power effects (rather than health
and quality outcome as in the functional tradition). In the studies, it is explained
that the audit culture constitutes a certain understanding of governance, which
Analytical perspectives on performance-based management 9
imply the introduction of certain surveillance systems (Strathern, 2000a, 2000b).
Since ‘audit thinking’ has become an integral part of the culture in Western
societies, it shapes the way individuals think about health care quality. The
post-modern studies provide examples showing the governance idea can become
so ingrained that it is not really questioned; alternatives become very hard to
consider; and the only answer to failed governance attempts ironically becomes
more surveillance of the same kind (Amit, 2000: 215–218). Shore and Wright
(2000) describe, for example, how PBM becomes an obvious governance form
when organizational problems are understood as a consequence of lack of control:
PBM in this way serves as a solution producing its own problems, by assisting in
the definition of, for example, ‘lack of competition’, ‘lack of quality control’, etc.
as important issues to be addressed. In a post-modern perspective, the purpose of
PBM systems can therefore not be seen as very specific. Rather it has become a
largely unquestioned way of understanding public sector governance, and since it
becomes constitutive for the way organizational problems are understood it tends
to reproduce societal power relations (Shore and Wright, 2000: 72).
The authors in this perspective draw upon post-structuralist ideas about
governance when they explain how individuals adopt cultural norms and come to
evaluate their own thoughts and behaviour in accordance to them; in this view, we
become our own evaluators (Amit, 2000: 217; Shore and Wright, 2000: 76–77;
Strathern, 2000a: 283, 2000b). In a post-modern perspective, the governance
mechanism can thereby be understood as an internalization of cultural norms and
values, and therefore hospital managers and employees come to understand and
evaluate their practices within an ‘audit logic’. So, in a post-modern perspective,
PBM has become part of the way we think about core concepts such as quality,
management and health care. In this perspective, motivation is therefore not
understood as attempts to comply with external norms to improve organizational
survival chances as in the interpretive perspective, but rather to act in accordance
with internalized understandings of what constitutes rational behaviour. While the
studies lend themselves to critique in terms of structural determinism, the analyses
of PBM as audit culture imply possibilities for a dynamic conception of agency
since ideas about what constitutes rational management must be continuously
reaffirmed to remain dominant. Dominant cultural ideas can from this point of
view be challenged by contra discourses and other forms of oppositions, and the
cultural studies share a goal of contributing awareness and reflection about PBM
as a certain way of thinking governance.
The studies we categorise as post-modern point at very fundamental effects of
this audit culture such as the altering of meanings of core concepts. For instance,
health care quality can come to be understood in accordance with a logic of
measurability. The authors warn that other understandings of what it means to
deliver good care (Shore and Wright, 2000: 72) or be a responsible leader (Grey
and Garsten, 2001) is left out, and that important experiences and other forms of
‘tacit knowledge’ will be lost in that process. While studies in the functional
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perspective highlight the promotion of patient centeredness by PBM system,
studies in the post-modern perspective tend to discuss consumer choice more in
term of the responsibility that patients are expected to assume for their choices
(Amit, 2000). Further, it is explained that the formulation of standards for good
practice changes behavioural norms and tend to substitute professional autonomy
for external control (Shore and Wright, 2000: 78). This, it is explained, is likely to
affect professional self-conceptions and possibly reduce engagement, loyalty and
perceived responsibility (Shore and Wright, 2000: 77–78; Waring, 2007; Shore,
2008) since the control aspect of PBM questions professionalism. Further it is
underlined that it may lead to a distrustful and insecure work environment (Amit,
2000: 217; Giri, 2000: 174; Shore and Wright, 2000: 77–78; Strathern 2000a:
4, 2000b). In an interview-based investigation of possible effects of audit-systems
in British hospitals, it was indicated that documentation and control came to
dominate over care aspects to a degree where nurses became indifferent towards
their work (Cooke, 2006). In this way, in a post-modern perspective, it is shown
that PBM holds potential to reshape professional cultures of health care delivery.
Thus, while the studies in the interpretive perspective focus on organizational
stability and long-term consequences for health system development, the studies in
the post-modern approach are concerned with implications for interpersonal
relations (culture of mistrust) and alterations of the conception of health care
quality and health professionals’ identity.
Table 2. Conception of purpose, governance mechanism and effects in the three analytical
perspectives on PBM
Functional Interpretive Post-modern
Purpose Improving health care
service delivery
Ensuring legitimacy of
health care institutions
The purpose is to stabilize
societal power relations
Governance
mechanism
Improved health care
service delivery obtained
via increased competition
among hospitals
Implementation of PBM
initiatives makes health care
decision makers live up to
dominant management norms
Internalization of cultural
values and self-evaluation
of behaviour
Identified
effects
Effects relate to performance
measures. Intended
outcomes include the
reduction of readmission
rates, waiting time and
maybe patient mortality.
Unintended outcomes
include data manipulation,
narrowing of managerial
attention and hampering of
long term planning
Increased organizational
stability and maybe
organizational survival.
Stability may, however,
come at the expense of
unproductive resource
spending. In the long term,
the uptake of management
ideas will establish certain
‘paths’ for health system
development
Being part of an ‘audit
culture’ may affect the
identity of health care
professionals, cause a culture
of control, mistrust and
insecurity and eventually
shift power balances and
conceptions of health care
quality and thereby influence
health care delivery through
changes in work ethics
PBM5 performance-based management.
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Conclusion
In this study, three analytical approaches to the study of PBM have been
constructed based on a literature synthesis: a ‘functional’, an ‘interpretive’ and a
‘post-modern’ perspective. We have shown that there are several ways of
understanding PBM and multiple explanations of the introduction of such
management systems into the health care sector. PBM can be viewed as a
management tool designed to improve the quality of health care services by
disclosing performance data to the public, as it is the case in the approach we
have termed ‘functional’. However, studies taking a functional approach have
also shown that sometimes PBM does not meet the expectations and produce
unintended effects. Seeking to explain this (e.g. by pointing to the use of
inadequate performance indicators), the studies in the functional perspective still
rely on assumptions about rational choice and it remains implicit how and why
organizational agents react the way they do. In contrast, the studies in the
interpretive and post-modern perspectives focus on explaining the adaptation
of PBM systems and the ways in which PBM can alter understandings of
what constitutes, for example, good care and responsible management. The
two perspectives provide different explanations, which we might view as
complementary rather than competing. While the studies in the functional
perspective tend to focus on short-term organizational effects of PBM systems,
studies conducted from the interpretive and post-modern perspectives often
point to broader implications of PBM, that become manifest in the long run.
The divergent perspectives on PBM temporality reflect differing conceptions of
causality. Whereas studies in the functional perspective adopt a linear under-
standing of causality, studies undertaken from an interpretive or post-modern
perspective assume that the adoption of PBM rarely stems from analysis of
existing organizational problems; rather PBM is adopted because it already
resonates with some values and it in turn helps identifying the problems that
organizations will address. Why then adopt PBM? In an interpretive perspective,
emphasis is on the symbolic value of PBM as a means of ensuring the legitimacy
of health care institutions. From a post-modern perspective, PBM is understood
as a socio-political phenomenon having unacknowledged implications for the
values organizational actors orient themselves towards. Each tradition helps us
appreciate different aspects of PBM and attunes our attention to different
caveats and possibilities. The functional tradition can facilitate the development
of refined tools for PBM; the interpretive tradition can dismantle some of
the illusions of rationality and encourage more careful problem analysis in the
process of adaptation, implementation, dissemination and recapture; and the
post-modern tradition can provoke consideration of easily forgotten potential
implications relating, for example, to work ethics and the reduction of
health care quality to measurable items. Our synthesis has illustrated how each
perspective throws light on different aspects of PBM and, in consequence, how
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each approach is selective. The key point is therefore that it is important to
consider all perspectives in health care quality management to ensure vigilant
use of shifting popular management tools.
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